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(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2008 
Syllabus 
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Syllabus 
FLORES-FIGUEROA v. UNITED STATES 
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
No. 08-108. Argued February 25, 2009-Decided May 4, 2009 
A federal statute forbidding "[a]ggravated identity theft" imposes a 
mandatory consecutive 2-year prison term on an individual convicted 
of certain predicate crimes if, during (or in relation to) the commis-
sion of those other crimes, the offender "knowingly ... uses, without 
lawful authority, a means of identification of another person." 18 
U.S. C. §1028A(a)(1) (emphasis added). After petitioner Flores-
Figueroa, a Mexican citizen, gave his employer counterfeit Social Se-
curity and alien registration cards containing his name but other 
people's identification numbers, he was arrested and charged with 
two immigration offenses and aggravated identity theft. Flores 
moved for acquittal on the latter charge, claiming that the Govern-
ment could not prove that he knew that the documents' numbers 
were assigned to other people. The District Court agreed with the 
Government that the word "knowingly" in §1028A(a)(1) does not mod-
ify the statute's last three words, "of another person," and, after trial, 
found Flores guilty on all counts. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. 
Held: Section § 1028(a)(1) requires the Government to show that the 
defendant knew that the means of identification at issue belonged to 
another person. As a matter of ordinary English grammar, "know-
ingly" is naturally read as applying to all the subsequently listed 
elements of the crime. Where a transitive verb has an object, listen-
ers in most contexts assume that an adverb (such as "knowingly") 
that modifies the verb tells the listener how the subject performed 
the entire action, including the object. The Government does not 
provide a single example of a sentence that, when used in typical 
fashion, would lead the hearer to a contrary understanding. And 
courts ordinarily interpret criminal statutes consistently with the or-
dinary English usage . See, e.g., Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 
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419. The Government argues that this position is incorrect because it 
would either require the same language to be interpreted differently 
in a neighboring provision or would render the language in that pro-
vision superfluous. This argument fails for two reasons. Finally, the 
Government's arguments based on the statute's purpose and on the 
practical problems of enforcing it are not sufficient to overcome the 
ordinary meaning, in English or through ordinary interpretive prac-
tice, of Congress' words. Pp. 4-11, 
274 Fed. Appx. 501, reversed and remanded. 
BREYER, J ., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 
C. J ., and STEVENS, KENNEDY, SOUTER, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined. 
SCALIA, J ., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment, in which THOMAS,.J., joined. ALITO, J., filed an opinion con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment. 
Cite as: 556 U.S._ (2009) 
Opinion of the Court 
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to 
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order 
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 08-108 
IGNACIO CARLOS FLORES-FIGUEROA, 
PETITIONER u. UNITED STATES 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
[May 4, 2009] 
J USTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court. 
A federal criminal statute forbidding "[a]ggravated 
identity theft" imposes a mandatory consecutive 2-year 
prison term upon individuals convicted of certain other 
crimes if, during (or in relation to) the commission of those 
other crimes, the offender "l:mowingly transfers, possesses, 
or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification 
of another person." 18 U.S. C. §1028A(a)(l) (emphasis 
added). The question is whether the statute requires the 
Government to show that the defendant !mew that the 
"means of identification" he or she unlawfully transferred, 
possessed, or used, in fact, belonged to "another person." 
We conclude that it does. 
I 
A 
The statutory provision in question references a set of 
predicate crimes, including, for example, theft of govern-
ment property, fraud, or engaging in various unlawful 
activities related to passports, visas, and immigration. 
§1028A(c). It then provides that if any person who com-
mits any of those other crimes (in doing so) "knowingly 
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transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a 
means of identification of another person," the judge must 
add two years' imprisonment to the offender's underlying 
sentence. § 1028A(a)(l). All parties agree that the provi-
sion applies only where the offender knows that he is 
transferring, possessing, or using something. And the 
Government reluctantly concedes that the offender likely 
must know that he is transferring, possessing, or using 
that something without lawful authority. But they do not 
agree whether the provision requires that a defendant also 
know that the something he has unlawfully transferred is, 
for example, a real ID belonging to another person rather 
than, say, a fake ID (i.e., a group of numbers that does not 
correspond to any real Social Security number). 
Petitioner Ignacio Flores-Figueroa argues that the 
statute requires that the Government prove that he knew 
that the "means of identification" belonged to someone 
else, i.e., was "a means of identification of another person." 
The Government argues that the statute does not impose 
this particular knowledge requirement. The Government 
concedes that the statute uses the word "knowingly," but 
that word, the Government claims, does not modify the 
statute's last phrase ("a means of identification of another 
person") or, at the least, it does not modify the last three 
words of that phrase ("of another person") . 
B 
The facts of this case illustrate the legal problem. Igna-
cio Flores-Figueroa · is a citizen of Mexico. In 2000, to 
secure employment, Flores gave his employer a false 
name, birth date, and Social Security number, along with 
a counterfeit alien registration card. The Social Security 
number and the number on the alien registration card 
were not those of a real person. In 2006, Flores presented 
his employer with new counterfeit Social Security and 
alien registration cards; these cards (unlike Flores' old 
Cite as: 556 U.S. _ (2009) 3 
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alien registration card) used his real name. But this time 
the numbers on both cards were in fact numbers assigned 
to other people. 
Flores' employer reported his. request to U. S. Immigra-
tion and Customs Enforcement. Customs discovered that 
the numbers on Flores' new documents belonged to other 
people. The United States then charged Flores with two 
predicate crimes, namely, entering the United States 
without inspection, S U.S. C. §1325(a), and misusing 
immigration documents, lS U.S. C. §1546(a). And it 
charged him with aggravated identity theft, lS U. S. C. 
§102SA(a)(l), the crime at issue here. 
Flores moved for a judgment of acquittal on the "aggra-
vated identity theft" counts. He claimed that the Govern-
ment could not prove that he !mew that the numbers on 
the counterfeit documents were numbers assigned to other 
people. The Government replied that it need not prove 
that knowledge, and the District Court accepted the Gov-
ernment's argument. After a bench trial, the court found 
Flores guilty of the predicate crimes and aggravated iden-
tity theft. The Court of Appeals upheld the District 
Court's determination. 274 Fed. Appx. 501 (CAS 200S) 
(per curiam). And we .granted certiorari to consider the 
"knowledge" issue-a matter about which the Circuits 
have disagreed. Compare United States v. Godin, 534 
F. 3d 51 (CAl 200S) (knowledge requirement applies to "of 
another person"); United States v. Miranda-Lopez, 532 
F. 3d 1034 (CA9 200S) (same); United States v. Villanueva-
Sotelo, 515 F . 3d 1234 (CADC 200S) (same), with United 
States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F . 3d 912 (CAS 200S) 
(knowledge requirement does not apply to "of another 
person"); United States v. Hurtado , 50S F . 3d 603 (CAll 
2007) (per curiam) (same); United States v. Montejo, 442 
F . 3d 213 (CA4 2006) (same). 
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II 
There are strong textual reasons for rejecting the Gov-
ernment's position. As a matter of ordinary English 
grammar, it seems natural to read the statute's word 
"knowingly" as applying to all the subsequently listed 
elements of the crime. The Government cannot easily 
claim that the word "knowingly" applies only to the stat-
utes first four words, or even its first seven. It makes 
little sense to read the provision's language as heavily 
penalizing a person who "transfers, possesses, or uses, 
without lawful authority" a something, but does not .know, 
at the very least, that the "something" (perhaps inside a 
box) is a "means of identification." Would we apply a 
statute that makes it unlawful "knowingly to possess 
drugs" to a person who steals a passenger's bag without 
knowing that the bag has drugs inside? 
The Government claims more forcefully that the word 
"knowingly" applies to all but the statute's last three 
words, i.e., "of another person." The statute, the Govern-
ment says, does not require a prosecutor to show that the 
defendant knows that the means of identification the 
defendant has unlawfully used in fact belongs to another 
person. But how are we to square this reading with the 
statute's language? 
In ordinary English, where a transitive verb has an 
object, listeners in most contexts assume that an adverb 
(such as knowingly) that modifies the transitive verb tells 
the listener how the subject performed the entire action, 
including the object as set forth in the sentence. Thus, if a 
bank official says, "Smith knowingly transferred the funds 
to his brother's account," we would normally understand 
the bank official's statement as telling us that Smith knew 
the account was his brother's. Nor would it matter if the 
bank official said "Smith knowingly transferred the funds 
to the account of his brother." In either instance, if the 
bank official later told us that Smith did not know the 
Cite as: 556 U. S._ (2009) 5 
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account belonged to Smith's brother, we should be 
surprised. 
Of course, a statement that does not use the word 
"knowingly" may be unclear about just what Smith knows. 
Suppose Smith mails his bank draft to Tegucigalpa, which 
(perhaps unbeknownst to Smith) is the capital of Hondu-
ras. If the bank official says, "Smith sent a bank draft to 
the capital of Honduras," he has expressed next to nothing 
about Smith's knowledge of that geographic identity. But 
if the official were to say, "Smith knowingly sent a bank 
draft to the capital of Honduras," then the official has 
suggested that Smith knows his geography. 
Similar examples abound. If a child knowingly takes a 
toy that belongs to his sibling, we assume that the child 
not only knows that he is taking something, but that he 
also knows that what he is taking is a toy and that the toy 
belongs to his sibling. If we say that someone knowingly 
ate a sandwich with cheese, we normally assume that the 
person knew both that he was eating a sandwich and that 
it contained cheese. Or consider the Government's own 
example, " 'John knowingly discarded the homework of his 
sister."' Brief for United States 9. The Government 
rightly points out that this sentence "does not necessarily" 
imply that John knew whom the homework belonged to. 
Ibid. (emphasis added). But that is what the sentence, as 
ordinarily used, does imply. 
At the same time, dissimilar examples are not easy to 
find. The Government says that "knowingly" modifies 
only the verbs in the statute, while remaining indifferent 
to the subject's knowledge of at least part of the transitive 
verb's object. In certain contexts, a listener might under-
stand the word "knowingly" to be used in that way. But 
the Government has not provided us with a single exam-
ple of a sentence that, when used in typical fashion, would 
lead the hearer to believe that the word "knowingly" modi-
fies only a transitive verb without the full object, i.e., that 
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it leaves the hearer gravely uncertain about the subject's 
state of mind in respect to the full object of the transitive 
verb in the sentence. The likely reason is that such sen-
tences typically involve special contexts or themselves 
provide a more detailed explanation of background cir-
cumstances that call for such a reading. As JUSTICE ALITO 
notes, the inquiry into a sentence's meaning is a contex-
tual one. See post, at 3 (opinion concurring in part and 
concurring in judgment). No special context is present 
here . See infra, at 8-10. 
The manner in which the courts ordinarily interpret 
criminal statutes is fully consistent with this ordinary 
English usage. That is to say courts ordinarily read a 
phrase in a criminal statute that introduces the elements 
of a crime with the word "knowingly" as applying that 
word to each element. United States v. X-Citement Video, 
Inc., 513 U. S. 64, 79 (1994) (STEVENS, J ., concurring). For 
example, in Liparota v. United States , 471 U.S. 419 
(1985), this Court interpreted a federal food stamp statute 
that said, '"whoever knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, 
alters, or possesses coupons or authorization cards in any 
manner not authorized by [law!" is subject to imprison-
ment. Id., at 420, n. 1. The question was whether the 
word "knowingly" applied to the phrase "in any manner 
not authorized by [law]." Id. , at 423. The Court held that 
it did, id., at 433, despite the legal cliche "ignorance of the 
law is no excuse." 
More recently, we had to interpret a statute that penal-
izes "[a]ny person who-(1) knowingly transports or ships 
using any means or facility of interstate or foreign com-
merce by any means including by computer or mails, any 
visual depiction, if-(A) the producing of such visual depic-
tion involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct." 18 U. S. C. §2252(a)(1)(A); X-Citement 
Video, supra. In issue was whether the term "knowingly" 
in paragraph (1) modified the phrase "the use of a minor" 
Cite as: 556 U. S. _ (2009) 7 
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in subparagraph (A). Id., at 69. The language in issue in 
X-Citement Video (like the language in Liparota) was more 
ambiguous than the language here not only because the 
phrase "the use of a minor" was not the direct object of the 
verbs modified by "knowingly," but also because it ap-
peared in a different subsection. 513 U. S., at 68-69. 
Moreover, the fact that many sex crimes involving minors 
do not ordinarily require that a perpetrator know that his 
victim is a minor supported the Government's position. 
Nonetheless, we again found that the intent element 
applied to "the use of a minor." Id., at 72, and n . 2. Again 
the Government, while pointing to what it believes are 
special features of each of these cases, provides us with no 
convincing counterexample, although there may be such 
statutory instances. 
The Government correctly points out that in these cases 
more was at issue than proper use of the English lan-
guage. But if more is at issue here, what is it? The Gov-
ernment makes a further textual argument, a complex 
argument based upon a related provision of the statute. 
That provision applies "[a]ggravated identity theft" where 
the predicate crime is terrorism. See § 1028A(a)(2). The 
provision uses the same language as the provision before 
us up to the end, where it adds the words "or a false iden-
tification document." Thus, it penalizes anyone who 
"knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful 
authority, a means of identification of another person or a 
false identification document." §1028A(a)(2). 
The Government's argument has four steps. Step One: 
We should not interpret a statute in a manner that makes 
some of its language superfluous. See, e.g., TRW Inc. v. 
Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001). Step Two: A person who 
knows that he is transferring, possessing, or using a 
'"means of identification"' '"without lawful authority,"' 
must know that the document either (a) belongs '"to an-
other person'" or (b) is a '"false identification document'" 
8 FLORES-FIGUEROA v. UNITED STATES 
Opinion of the Court 
because "'there are no other choices."' Brief for United 
States 14 (emphasis added). Step Three: Requiring the 
offender to know that the "means of identification" belongs 
to another person would consequently be superfluous in 
this terrorism provision. Step Four: We should not inter-
pret the same phrase ("of another person") in the two 
related sections differently. 
If we ·understand the argument correctly, it seems to 
suffer two serious fla'A7s. If the two listed circumstances 
(where the ID belongs to another person; where the ID is 
false) are the only two circumstances possibly present 
when a defendant (in this particular context) unlawfully 
uses a "means of identification," then why list them at all? 
Why not just stop after criminalizing the knowing unlaw-
ful use of a "means of identification"? (Why specify that 
Congress does not mean the statute to cover, say, the use 
of dog tags?) The fact is, however, that the Government's 
reasoning at Step Two is faulty. The two listed circum-
stances are not the only two circumstances possibly pre-
sent when a defendant unlawfully uses a "means of identi-
fication." One could, for example, verbally provide a seller 
or an employer with a made-up Social Security number, 
not an "identification document," and the number verbally 
transmitted to the seller or employer might, or might not, 
turn out to belong to another person. The word "know-
ingly" applied to the "other person" requirement (even in a 
statute that similarly penalizes use of a "false identifica-
tion document") would not be surplus. 
The Government also considers the statute's purpose to 
be a circumstance showing that the linguistic context here 
is special. It describes that purpose as "provid[ing] en-
hanced protection for individuals whose identifying infor-
mation is used to facilitate the commission of crimes." Id., 
at 5. And it points out that without the knowledge re-
quirement, potential offenders will take great care to avoid 
wrongly using IDs that belong to others, thereby enhanc-
Cite as: 556 U. S. _ (2009) 9 
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ing the protection that the statute offers. 
The question, however, is whether Congress intended to 
achieve this enhanced protection by permitting conviction 
of those who do not know the ID they unlawfully use refers 
to a real person, i.e., those who do not intend to cause this 
further harm. And, in respect to this latter point, the 
statute's history (outside of the statute's language) is 
inconclusive. 
On the one hand, some statements in the legislative 
history offer the Government a degree of support. The 
relevant House Report refers, for example, both to "iden-
tity theft" (use of an ID belonging to someone else) and to 
"identity fraud" (use of a false ID), often without distin-
guishing between the two. See, e.g., H. R. Rep. No. 108-
528, p . 25 (2004) (statement of Rep. Coble). And, in equat-
ing fraud and theft, Congress might have meant the stat-
ute to cover both-at least where the fraud takes the form 
of using an ID that (without the offender's knowledge) 
belongs to someone else. 
On the other hand, Congress separated the fraud crime 
from the theft crime in the statute itself. The title of one 
provision (not here at issue) is "Fraud and related activity 
in connection with identification documents, authentica-
tion features, and information." 18 U. 8 . C. § 1028. The 
title of another provision (the provision here at issue) uses 
the words "identity theft." §1028A (emphasis added) . 
Moreover, the examples of theft that Congress gives in the 
legislative history all involve instances where the offender 
would know that what he has taken identifies a different 
real person. H. R. Rep. No. 108-528, at 4-5 (identifying as 
examples of "identity theft" " 'dumpster diving,'" "access-
ing information that was originally collected for an author-
ized purpose," "hack[ing] into computers ," and "steal[ing] 
paperwork likely to contain personal information") . 
Finally, and perhaps of greatest practical importance, 
there is the difficulty in many circumstances of proving 
10 FLORES-FIGUEROA v. UNITED STATES 
Opinion of the Court 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant has the neces-
sary knowledge. Take an instance in which an alien who 
unlawfully entered the United States gives an employer 
identification documents that in fact belong to others. 
How is the Government to prove that the defendant knew 
that this was so? The Government may be able to show 
that such a defendant knew the papers were not his. But 
perhaps the defendant did not care whether the papers (1) 
were real papers belonging to another person or (2) were 
simply counterfeit papers. The difficulties of proof along 
with the defendant's necessary guilt of a predicate crime 
and the defendant's necessary knowledge that he has 
acted "without lawful authority," make it reasonable, in 
the Government's view, to read the statute's language as 
dispensing with the knowledge requirement. 
We do not find this argument sufficient, however, to 
turn the tide in the Government's favor. For one thing, in 
the classic case of identity theft, intent is generally not 
difficult to prove. For example, where a defendant has 
used another person's identification information to get 
access to that person's bank account, the Government can 
prove knowledge with little difficulty. The same is true 
when the defendant has gone through someone else's trash 
to find discarded credit card and bank statements, or 
pretends to be from the victim's bank and requests per-
sonal identifying information. Indeed, the examples of 
identity theft in the legislative history (dumpster diving, 
computer hacking, and the like) are all examples of the 
types of classic identity theft where intent should be rela-
tively easy to prove, and there will be no practical en-
forcement problem. For another thing, to the extent that 
Congress may have been concerned about criminalizing 
the conduct of a broader class of individuals, the concerns 
about practical enforceability are insufficient to outweigh 
the clarity of the text. Similar interpretations that we 
have given other similarly phrased statutes also created 
Cite as: 556 U. S. _ (2009) 11 
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practical enforcement problems. See, e.g., X-Citement 
Video, 513 U. S. 64; Liparota, 471 U. S. 419. But had 
Congress placed conclusive weight upon practical en-
forcement, the statute would likely not read the way it 
now reads. Instead, Congress used the word "knowingly" 
followed by a list of offense elements. And we cannot find 
indications in statements of its purpose or in the practical 
problems of enforcement sufficient to overcome the ordi-
nary meaning, in English or through ordinary interpretive 
practice, of the words that it wrote. 
We conclude that §1028A(a)(1) requires the Government 
to show that the defendant knew that the means of identi-
fication at issue belonged to another person. The judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
Cite as: 556 U. S. _ (2009) 1 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 08-108 
IGNACIO CARLOS FLORES-FIGUEROA, 
PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
[May 4, 2009] 
JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. 
I agree with the Court that to convict petitioner for 
"knowingly transfer[ring], possess[ing], or us[ing], without 
lawful authority, a means of identification of another 
person," 18 U.S. C. §1028A(a)(1), the Government must 
prove that he "knew that the 'means of identification' he 
. . . unlawfully transferred, possessed, or used, in fact, 
belonged to 'another person."' Ante, at 1. "Knowingly" is 
not limited to the statute's verbs, ante, at 4. Even the 
Government must concede that. See United States v. 
Villanue va-Sotelo, 515 F. 3d 1234, 1237 (CADC 2008) 
("According to the government, this text is unambiguous: 
the statute's knowledge requirement extends only so far as 
'means of identification' "). But once it is understood to 
modify the object of those verbs, there is no reason to 
believe it does not extend to the phrase which limits that 
object ("of another person"). Ordinary English usage 
supports this reading, as the Court's numerous sample 
sentences amply demonstrate. See ante, at 4-5. 
But the Court is not content to stop at the statute's text, 
and I do not join that further portion of the Court's opin-
ion. First, the Court relies in part on the principle that 
"courts ordinarily read a phrase in a criminal statute that 
introduces the elements of a crime with the word 'know-
2 FLORES-FIGUEROA u. UNITED STATES 
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ingly' as applying that word to each element." Ante, at 6. 
If that is meant purely as a description ofwhat most cases 
do, it is perhaps true, and perhaps not. I have not can-
vassed all the cases and am hence agnostic. If it is meant, 
however, as a normative description of what courts should 
ordinarily do when interpreting such statutes-and the 
reference to JUSTICE STEVENS' concurring opinion in 
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U. S. 64, 79 
(1994), suggests as much-then I surely do not agree. The 
structure of the text in X-Citement Video plainly separated 
the "use of a minor" element from the "knowingly" re-
quirement, wherefore I thought (and think) that case was 
wrongly decided. See id., at 80-81 (SCALIA, J., dissenting). 
It is one thing to infer the common-law tradition of a mens 
rea requirement where Congress has not addressed the 
mental element of a crime. See Staples v. United States, 
511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994); United States v. United States 
Gypsum Co., 438 U. S. 422, 437-438 (1978). It is some-
thing else to expand a mens rea requirement that the 
statutory text has carefully limited. 
I likewise cannot join the Court's discussion of the (as 
usual, inconclusive) legislative history. Ante, at 9. Rely-
ing on the statement of a single Member of Congress or an 
unvoted-upon (and for all we know unread) Committee 
Report to expand a statute beyond the limits its text sug-
est · - a s a dubious enterprise. And consulting those 
· cunabula than eye to making criminal what the text 
W.U.J..U.l.'-"""u"'rwise permit is even more suspect. See United 
States v. R. L. C., 503 U.S. 291, 307- 309 (1992) (SCALIA, 
J ., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). In-
deed, it is not unlike the practice of Caligula, who report-
edly "wrote his laws in a very small character, and hung 
them up upon high pillars, the more effectually to ensnare 
the people," 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws 
of England 46 (1765). 
The statute's text is clear, and I would reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals on that ground alone. 
Cite as: 556 U.S._ (2009) 1 
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JUSTICE ALITO, concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment. 
While I am in general agreement with the opinion of the 
Court, I write separately because I am concerned that the 
Court's opinion may be read by some as adopting an overly 
rigid rule of statutory construction. The Court says that 
"[i]n ordinary English, where a transitive verb has an 
object, listeners in most contexts assume that an adverb 
(such as knowingly) that modifies the transitive verb tells 
the listener how the subject performed the entire action, 
including the object as set forth in the sentence." Ante, at 
4. The Court adds that counterexamples are "not easy to 
find," ante, at 5, and I suspect that the Court's opinion will 
be cited for the proposition that the mens rea of a federal 
criminal statute nearly always applies to every element of 
the offense. 
I think that the Court's point about ordinary English 
usage is overstated. Examples of sentences that do not 
conform to the Court's rule are not hard to imagine. For 
example: "The mugger knowingly assaulted two people in 
the park-an employee of company X and a jogger from 
town Y." A person hearing this sentence would not likely 
assume that the mugger knew about the first victim's 
employer or the second victim's home town. What matters 
in this example, and the Court's, is context. 
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More to the point, ordinary writers do not often con-
struct the particular kind of sentence at issue here, i.e., a 
complex sentence in which it is important to determine 
from the sentence itself whether the adverb denoting the 
actor's intent applies to every characteristic of the sen-
tence's direct object. Such sentences are a staple of crimi-
nal codes, but in ordinary speech, a different formulation 
is almost always used when the speaker wants to be clear 
on the point. For example, a speaker might say: "Flores-
Figueroa used a Social Security number that he knew 
belonged to someone else" or "Flores-Figueroa used a 
Social Security number that just happened to belong to a 
real person." But it is difficult to say with the confidence 
the Court conveys that there is an "ordinary" understand-
ing of the usage ofthe phrase at issue in this case. 
In interpreting a criminal statute such as the one before 
us, I think it is fair to begin with a general presumption 
that the specified mens rea applies to all the elements of 
an offense, but it must be recognized that there are in-
stances in which context may well rebut that presumption. 
For example, 18 U. S. C. §2423(a) makes it unlawful to 
"knowingly transpor[t] an individual who has not attained 
the age of 18 years in interstate or foreign commerce ... 
with intent that the individual engage in prostitution, or 
in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged 
with a criminal offense." The Courts of Appeals have 
uniformly held that a defendant need not know the vic-
tim's age to be guilty under this statute. See, e.g., United 
States v. Griffith, 284 F. 3d 338, 350- 351 (CA2 2002); 
United States v. Taylor, 239 F. 3d 994, 997 (CA9 2001); cf. 
United States v. Chin, 981 F. 2d 1275, 1280 (CADC 1992) 
(Ginsburg, J.) (holding that 21 U. S. C. §861(a)(1), which 
makes it unlawful to "knowingly and intentionally . . . 
employ, hire, use, persuade, induce, entice, or coerce, a 
person under eighteen years of age to violate" drug laws, 
does not require the defendant to have knowledge of the 
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minor's age) . Similarly, 8 U.S. C. §1327 makes it unlaw-
ful to "knowingly ai[d] or assis[t] any alien inadmissible 
under section 1182(a)(2) (insofar as an alien inadmissible 
under such section has been convicted of an aggravated 
felony) ... to enter the United States." The Courts of 
Appeals have held that the term "knowingly" in this con-
text does not require the defendant to know that the alien 
had been convicted of an aggravated felony. See, e.g., 
United States v. Flares-Garcia, 198 F. 3d 1119, 1121-1123 
(CA9 2000); United States v. Figueroa, 165 F. 3d 111, 118-
119 (CA2 1998). 
In the present case, however, the Government has not 
pointed to contextual features that warrant interpreting 
18 U. S. C. § 1028A(a)(1) in a similar way. Indeed, the 
Government's interpretation leads to exceedingly odd 
results . Under that interpretation, if a defendant uses a 
made-up Social Security number without having any 
reason to know whether it belongs to a real person, the 
defendant's liability under §1028A(a)(1) depends on 
chance: If it turns out that the number belongs to a real 
person, two years will be added to the defendant's sen-
tence, but if the defendant is lucky and the number does 
not belong to another person, the statute is not violated. 
I therefore concur in the judgment and join the opinion 
of the Court except insofar as it may be read to adopt an 
inflexible rule of construction that can rarely be overcome 
by contextual features pointing to a contrary reading. 
